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COMMENTS
THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
Defame, v.t. To lie about another.
To tell the truth about another.
Ambrose Bierce
The Devil's Dictionary
"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency," warned Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
their famous 1890 law review article, The Right to Privacy.' They were
concerned not with false or libelous reporting but with the disclosure of true
facts about an individual's private life and affairs with which the community
had "no legitimate concern."' 2 To deal with the subject of their apprehen-
sion, Warren and Brandeis developed the invasion of privacy concept into an
actionable tort.
Nearly a century later, with the tremendous growth of the mass communi-
cations media and its impact on American society, the Warren and Brandeis
warning remains timely. Not surprisingly, tort law concerning invasions of
privacy has mushroomed in the attempt to keep abreast of the media
explosion. 3 Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, however,
by attempting to shield the press against tort recovery through the broad
implementation of the first amendment privilege, have thrown the entire area
into a state of uncertainty.
4
Public disclosure of private facts is one of several causes of action
recognized in tort law for invasion of privacy.5 It arises when there has
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. Rlv. 193, 196 (1890).
2. Id. at 214.
3. The growth and development of this area of tort law is well chronicled by Dean
Prosser. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as PRossER].
4. The first amendment privilege was first applied in the area of tort privacy in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). It had previously been established for cases
involving defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See
pp. 276-78 infra.
5. The division of invasions of privacy into four distinct causes of action seems to
have been first recognized by Prosser. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. lRnv. 383
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been "publicity, of a highly objectionable kind, given to private information
about the plaintiff, even though it is true that no action would lie for
defamation." 6 Because no issue of falsification is involved, allowing recov-
ery against the press for such disclosure has been acknowledged as an area
which most directly confronts the guarantees of the first amendment.7
In light of the first amendment privilege, the viability of applying a tort
remedy for public disclosure of private facts against the media is an issue
which has caused significant debate among commentators s and one which
has yet to be squarely dealt with by the United States Supreme Court.9 This
article will explore the competing interests of the right of society to a free
and unhampered press and the right of the individual to be protected from
unwanted and undesirable publicity. An attempt will be made to determine
what kind of accommodation, if any, is possible between these rights under
the United States Constitution and, if reconciliation is possible, whether the
tort remedy for public disclosure of private facts by the press is suitable.
I. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
Before analyzing the constitutional issues, a brief examination of the
traditional tort remedy for public disclosure of private facts is essential. The
gravamen of public disclosure, as it will be convenient to label the tort in
question, is the revelation of true, private facts concerning a plaintiff. In
order to give rise to a cause of action, three requirements must be met: first,
the disclosure must be public, which is automatically the case when made by
the news media; second, the facts involved must be of a private, confidential
nature; third, the subject matter of the disclosure must be one that a reason-
able person of ordinary sensibilities would find offensive and objectionable. 10
Public disclosure must be distinguished both from other forms of invasion
of privacy and from defamation. The latter is concerned with the dissemi-
nation of falsehoods, while the tort of public disclosure involves the truth.
Placing an individual in a false light before the public eye, usually referred
(1960). In addition to public disclosure, they are (a) intrusion, (b) false light in the
public eye, and (c) appropriation. Public disclosure appears to be the tort that Warren
and Brandeis actually had in mind. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
6. PROSSER § 117, at 809.
7. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
8. Compare Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966), with Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Consti-
tution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Taxxs
L. REv. 611 (1968).
9. See p. 286 infra.
10. PROSSER § 117, at 810-11.
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to as a "false light" action, is a distinct cause of action for invasion of
privacy," as is that of appropriation, in which an individual's name or
image is used for the commercial benefit of another.' 2  Prying into the
personal affairs of an individual by such objectionable means as illegally
entering a home or electronically eavesdropping on a conversation is action-
able under another invasion of privacy tort, known as intrusion.13 Should
facts ascertained by intrusion subsequently be published, a cause of action
for either public disclosure or intrusion could be supported. 14
Two major defenses can be asserted in a public disclosure action. The
first is that of consent,' 5 in which, for example, one entering into a contract
whereby his picture is to be published is foreclosed from asserting that the
publication infringes on his right to privacy.' 6 The second defense, based
on the right to discuss and report on matters of public interest, is now
covered by the first amendment privilege and is discussed below.1
7
II. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION
The conflict of values inherent in encouraging public disclosure and
freedom of the press was recognized early in the development of the tort.' 8
Warren and Brandeis dealt with the problem by exempting "matter which is
of public or general interest" from liability.19 This public interest determi-
nation was to be made by looking to the qualified privilege of "fair
comment" under the common law rules of defamation.
20
Under the Warren and Brandeis view, the public interest exception was to
apply primarily to "public figures," who were to be denied recovery to the
11. Id. at 812-14. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (rabbi falsely pictured as equating religious faith with sexual freedom).
For a discussion of the close relationship between this branch of tort privacy and defa-
mation, see Wade, Defamation and the Right to Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962).
12. PROSSER § 117, at 804. See, e.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293,
106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) (use of plaintiff's picture in dog food advertisement).
13. PROSSER § 117, at 807-09. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206
A.2d 239 (1964) (listening device installed in plaintiff's bedroom).
14. This interrelationship is discussed in detail at pp. 294-96 infra. Of course, no
double recovery would be possible.
15. PROSSER § 117, at 817.
16. Id.
17. Some other defenses to defamation, such as the absolute privilege of a witness
to be free from liability for pertinent testimony in a judicial proceeding, probably apply
to privacy actions as well. See id. at 818.
18. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. App. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905).
19. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
20. Id. "Fair comment," the qualified privilege under common law to discuss matters
of public concern, is discussed in PROSSER § 118, at 8 22-23.
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degree that they had renounced their right to privacy.21 The intent behind
the distinction between public and private figures was to encourage commen-
tary on public officials and candidates for public office.22 While the judicial
development of public disclosure seems to reflect acceptance of these ideas, 2a
the courts did not limit the public figure classification to officials and can-
didates. The concept, as developed by the case law, included "a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs,
and his character, has become a public personage .... -24 Included in this
group were such luminaries as entertainers, 25 sports figures, 26 and war
heroes.
27
The demarcation of the category, albeit somewhat subjective, was less
troublesome to the courts than was a determination of the extent of the
publicity to be permitted. Obviously, no cause of action would lie for
publicity concerning the source of the public figure's fame or notoriety.28
The privilege, however, was held to be broader than this. As one frequently
quoted opinion expressed the problem:
Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the
victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency.
But when focused upon public characters, truthful comments upon
dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality will
usually not transgress this line.2
9
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 215.
22. Id. at 216.
23. See, e.g., Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1961); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951). Invasion of privacy
actions by public officials do not appear to be common. It is perhaps more politic for
an official to either ignore a story or to deny the truth of the matter and sue for defa-
matiom
24. PROSSER § 118, at 923. The definition is adapted from Cason v. Baskin, 159
Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
25. See, e.g., Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(Charlie Chaplin).
26. See, e.g., Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 321 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949) (suit by unsuccessful prize fighter for derogatory comments broadcast about him
by Groucho Marx).
27. See, e.g., Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670
(Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (defendant portrayed in motion picture "The Sands of Iwo
Jima").
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 652F, comment c,
at 128 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT.] Tentative
Draft No. 21, April 5, 1975, indicates that the comments to the final volume will be
substantially the same as the comments to Tentative Draft No. 13. Tent. Draft No.
21, supra, at 87.
29. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
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Thus, a public disclosure offensive to the reasonable person and possibly
actionable for a private individual would not be actionable for a public
figure in most instances.
The courts also applied the public interest exception to "involuntary public
figures," 30 private individuals who are involved in "matters of the kind
customarily regarded as 'news.'-"31 It was recognized that the need of
society for news generally outweighed the desire of the individual to be left
alone, and no recovery was allowed victims of such press accounts as those
disclosing the birth of a baby to a 12-year-old mother,3 2 the grief of a widow
who had just watched her husband murdered by hoodlums,3 3 or the identity
of those suspected of a crime.
3 4
Again, there exists the problem of to what extent publicity concerning
such involuntary public figures should be permitted. As with voluntary
public figures, the privilege is "not limited to the particular events which
arouse the interest of the public."3 5  Rather, it extends to information
concerning the individual's private life, disclosure of which would be action-
able for a private figure.3 6  However, recovery was permitted when the
disclosure was found to offend community standards of decency,37 or when
the court determined that the facts disclosed were not sufficiently "news-
worthy" to fall within the privilege. 8
The public interest exception, embodied by these rather amorphous rules,
was thus employed by the courts to protect the media from recovery for
public disclosure of private facts until the Supreme Court entered the arena
with the mandates of the first amendment.
30. See cases cited notes 32-34 infra.
31. RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Notes § 652F, comment e, at 129. The comment
explains that "to a considerable extent, in accordance with the mores of the community,
the publishers and broadcasters have themselves defined the term, as a glance at any
morning paper will confirm." Id. Judicial attempts to define the term have been no
more successful. See, e.g., Gallela v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
("News is real; Gallela promotes the phony." Id. at 217).
32. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
33. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921
(1958).
34. Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
35. RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Notes § 652F, comment f, at 130.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964)
(photograph of plaintiff with her dress blown over her waist). The phrase "matters of
public interest" was interpreted broadly by the courts, and recoveries were infrequent.
See cases cited notes 32-34 supra.
38. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (identity
of plaintiff with rare disease not newsworthy even if the disease was newsworthy).
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Warren and Brandeis could not have foreseen that 75 years after the
publication of The Right to Privacy, the "fair comment" exception to
defamation, upon which they based the public interest exception to privacy,
would be raised from a qualified privilege to a constitutional imperative. In
1964, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,89 the Supreme Court held that
the first amendment prohibited a public official from recovering in a libel
action for statements relating to his official conduct unless they were made
with "malice," that is, with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard
for whether or not they were false.
40
In 1967, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,41 the Supreme Court applied this standard
to a "false light" privacy action in which private individuals complained that
a magazine article about their experience as hostages of escaped convicts
inaccurately identified them as the protagonists of a new play which
portrayed a similar fictional incident. The basic holding of Hill, that false
reports of private individuals by the press will be tolerated unless they are
published with the requisite malice, is obviously not applicable to the public
disclosure of true facts.42 The idea behind the holding, however, and the
foundation for both Hill and the New York Times line of cases, has great
bearing on the subject. The press was protected from the consequences of
disseminating falsehoods negligently, as opposed to a requirement of gross
negligence or knowledge of falsity, so that it will not be induced to practice
self-censorship or shrink from the role it plays in the constitutional system
of maintaining the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate central
to the first amendment. 43 Alexander Meiklejohn, the original proponent
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (advertisement recounting harassment of Martin Luther
King by Montgomery, Alabama officials contained inaccuracies about police action).
40. Id. at 280. The principle was refined and expanded in a series of cases includ-
ing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v.
Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964). Rosenbloom, the highwater mark of the expansive interpretation of the
principle, was retreated from in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See
discussion pp. 283-84 infra. The choice of the term "malice" to describe knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth has met with criticism and has proven confus-
ing to lawyers. See PROSSER § 118, at 821; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52
n.18 (1971).
41. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). For a candid view of the case by counsel for the plaintiff,
see THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS 49 (Wash. Post ed. 1974).
42. But see Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974), which mis-
takenly applies malice to a public disclosure action.
43. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 'U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The consequences of
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of this theory, explained the rationale for this approach: "Self-government
can exist only insofar as ,the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitiv-
ity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a
ballot is assumed to express."'44  Since voter acquisition of these traits can
only come about through uninhibited debate, first amendment protection is
essential. Under this theory, speech which relates to and aids in self-govern-
ment is entitled to absolute protection. 45  To facilitate uninhibited debate,
false statements made in the course of sell-governing speech are protected
unless they are made with malice.
4"
The majority opinion in Hill, authored by Justice Brennan, interpreted the
concept of self-governing speech broadly, since "[t]he guarantees for speech
and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon
public affairs . . . ,,47 To afford the press sufficient breathing space to
flourish without fear of liability, information concerning any "matter of
public interest" must be brought under the first amendment's shield.4"
holding the press responsible for negligent falsehoods as opposed to malice was described
by Justice Brennan as follows:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually un-
limited in amount-leads to . . . "self-censorship".... .Under such a rule,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider
of the unlawful zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 279.
44. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255.
The strong influence of Professor Meiklejohn on the approach to the first amendment
taken by the Court in New York Times has been noted. See Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209.
45. Professor Meiklejohn expands on the self-governing speech concept in this man-
ner:
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak." It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we "gov-
ern". . . . We, the people who govern, must try to understand the issues
which, incident by incident, face the nation. We must pass judgment upon the
decisions which our agents make upon those issues. And, further, we must
share in devising methods by which those decisions can be made wise and ef-
fective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise greater wisdom and
effectiveness. . . . These are the activities to whose freedom it gives its un-
qualified protection.
Meiklejohn, supra note 44, at 255.
46. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
47. Id. at 388.
48. Id. Under the Hill view, even speech which is "entertainment" must come within
19761
Catholic University Law Review
Unfortunately, the outer boundary of this protected area is vaguely drawn,
reference being made only to the tort standard of an event materially
outrageous to community notions of decency.49
Application of the theories put forth in Hill to the tort of public disclosure
is clear. Disclosures which fall within the area of self-governing speech
deserve first amendment protection; this has been recognized by the
courts.50 Furthermore, the analogy can be made between toleration of
falsehoods disseminated by the press to foster self-governing speech and
toleration of disclosure of private and embarrassing facts concerning individ-
uals. The full effect of this interpretation of the first amendment, however,
cannot be determined so facilely. Is public disclosure swallowed up by the
first amendment privilege, as one distinguished commentator has suggest-
ed, 51 or has the traditional public interest exception merely been given a
constitutional imprimatur? In order to explore the problem thoroughly, the
varying classifications of "public figures" must be determined.
A. Public Officials
Public disclosure of private facts about public officials and candidates for
public office presents the least difficulty in this area of the law. The public's
need to know details of the lives of officials and candidates relevant to their
fitness for office is crucial to self-government, and much which might be held
beyond the bounds of the press for private individuals is undeniably within
bounds for candidates and officials.52 One court stated in applying the Hill
standard in a political candidate's public disclosure action:
the ambit of the first amendment since the line between "entertainment" and "informa-
tion" can be elusive. Id. This is in accord with Professor Meiklejohn's interpretation.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 44, at 257.
49. 385 U.S. at 383 n.7, quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
50. See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (plaintiff ob-
jected to appearance in the documentary film "Woodstock"); Cullen v. Grove Press,
Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiffs objected to appearance in documen-
tary film about mental institution in which they worked); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 App.
Div. 2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970) (plaintiffs objected to article and pictures of death
of their children).
51. See Kalven, supra note 8, at 336. For the suggestion that the first amendment
privilege should be limited to defamation and not applied to public disclosure at all, see
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
52. For example, exposure of a long forgotten criminal record which might be ac-
tionable concerning a private individual would be privileged as to a public official or
candidate. Compare Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34,
93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), with Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
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Because of their -public responsibilities, government officials
and candidates for such office have almost always been considered
the paradigm case of "public figures" who should be subjected to the
most thorough scrutiny. In choosing those who are to govern them,
the public must, of course, be afforded the opportunity of learning
about any facet of a candidate's life that may relate to his fitness
for office.
53
The attitude expressed is close to the original Warren and Brandeis concep-
tion of the public interest exception, making this one area of disclosure in
which the advent of the first amendment privilege has effected little change.
There remains a problem, however, of the degree of incursion into the life
of a candidate or official which should be allowed. The New York Times
standard has been held to apply to an official such as the auditor of a county
waterworks. 54 Clearly, such a figure has not renounced his right to privacy
to the same degree as has the President of the United States, though both are
estopped from recovering for injury incurred through publication of matters
relating to their fitness for office. It would be reasonable to assume,
however, that the President is subject to revelations having little to do with
his fitness for office, perhaps because he is a voluntary public figure to a
much greater extent than the auditor.55 In dealing with this problem, the
California courts take into account "the extent to which the party voluntarily
acceded to a position of public notoriety" 56 in determining whether a news
item is privileged in a privacy action.
Another unresolved difficulty is the possible application of the community
standard test in actions involving revelations about a public official. It
would seem that a disclosure of private facts relating to an individual's
fitness for office, no matter how shocking or intimate, would be within the
purview of self-governing speech and thus protected. Yet the Supreme
Court has declared that "some aspects of the lives of even the most public
men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern." 57
53. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36-37, 459 P.2d 912, 922-23, 81 Cal. Rptr.
360, 370-71 (1969).
54. See Krutech v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d 837, 278 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1967).
55. The President is, generally speaking, a public figure as well as a public official,
while the accountant is a public figure only to the extent that his office and position
in the community make him one.
56. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370
(1969).
57. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971). "This is not the less
true because the area of public concern in the cases of candidates for public office and
of elected public officials is broad." Id. at 48 n.16. This issue is examined at p. 295
infra.
1976]
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B. Voluntary Public Figures
The development of the voluntary public figure classification within the
traditional public interest exception to public disclosure has been discussed
previously. 5s The impact of the New York Times and Hill standards on
this rather amorphous rule does not greatly affect the previous rules. When
dealing with a public disclosure suit by an obvious celebrity, such as one
involving an account of the business and social career of Howard Hughes,
the court will merely utilize the first amendment privilege rather than the
public interest exception to label him a public figure and deny recovery.5 9
While in such a case the relation between the public disclosure and self-
governing speech is not as clear as the situation in which the person involved
is in or is seeking public office, the situation is nevertheless well within the
ambit of public interest marked by Hill.60
More difficult is the determination of the extent of publicity that will be
permitted, and the impact of the community standard test. A well-publi-
cized example puts the problem in proper perspective. Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis undoubtedly possesses the qualifications of a public figure. The first
amendment privilege as it applies to Ms. Onassis' tort remedy for disclosure
can be examined in light of three specific instances. The first, and the only
one which has been considered by the courts, 61 concerns the campaign of
photographer 'Ron Gallela to record nearly every moment of Ms. Onassis'
waking existence for the edification of -the public. In dealing with her in-
vasion of privacy claim against Gallela, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York easily established that she was "a public
figure, whose life has included events of great public concern." '6 2 Applying
the self-governing speech criterion of the first amendment in a balancing test,
the court held that matters relating to those events clearly outweighed Ms.
Onassis' right to privacy.a3 However, the court stated that
it cannot be said that information about her comings and goings,
her tastes in ballet, the food that she eats, and other minutiae which
58. See notes 23-30 & accompanying text supra.
59. See Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. App. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (Leopold of
Leopold and Loeb); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d
1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afrd, 32 App. Div. 2d 942, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948
(1969) (Howard Hughes); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (Pat Paulsen); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House,
Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968) (widow of Ernest Hem-
ingway).
60. See 385 U.S. at 387-88.
61. Gallela v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aII'd as modified, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. 353 F. Supp. at 225.
63. Id.
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are the sole product of Gallela's three years of pursuit, bear signifi-
cantly upon public questions or otherwise "enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period." It merely satis-
fies curiosity.
4
The court's use of a balancing test is not consistent with the Meiklejohn
interpretation of the first amendment, which determines whether speech is
protected solely on the grounds of whether or not it is related to self-
government. 5  The district court's conclusion also runs afoul of the tradi-
tional tort rules providing that photographs of individuals in public places are
protected because no "private facts" have been disclosed.6 This would
seem to apply to a public figure like Ms. Onassis.
Whatever fault may be found with the court's reasoning, however, the
result it reached seems correct. It is important to note that the situation
involved more than mere disclosure. The district court opinion recounts at
length the manner in which Gallela pursued his quarry, including instances
of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional harm.67 Such
activities are outside the range of first amendment protection even under the
broadest standards.68 The remedy afforded Ms. Onassis, as modified by the
court of appeals, neither awarded damages for the publication of the
photographs nor enjoined Galella from taking and publishing such photo-
graphs in the future; rather, it was directed at restricting the manner in
which future photographs may be taken.69
Even had the district court eschewed the balancing test for application of a
strict Hill approach, the result should have been the same. Pictures of a
famous person going about her daily public activities could seem to come
within the "breathing space" allowed the press by Hill for fear of choking off
more important news. 70 In this situation, then, the first amendment does
not seem to have expanded the traditional rules of the public disclosure tort.
The second example involving Ms. Onassis concerns a recent series of
newspaper columns by muckraker Jack Anderson, in which facts about her
personal finances and spending habits were disclosed, having been obtained
64. Id. at 225.
65. See Meiklejohn, supra note 44, at 255. See also Brennan, supra note 44, at 11-12.
66. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
Contra, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. App. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964).
67. 353 F. Supp. at 216-17.
68. See H. BLACK, A CONSTITTIONAL FAITH 44-45 (1969). Justice Black, who felt
that any law restricting actual speech was completely unconstitutional, did not feel this
protection extended to action, particularly of an unlawful nature.
69. 487 F.2d at 998.
70. See 385 U.S. at 388.
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from her private financial records. 71 Under traditional tort rules, disclosure
of an individual's private records seems to be actionable,7 2 whether or not
the individual is a public figure. Yet, under the Hill approach a strong
argument can be made to include such a disclosure within the breathing
space envisioned for the first amendment privilege.
73
The third example concerns surreptitiously taken nude photographs of Ms.
Onassis that were recently published in an unseemly American magazine.
74
Publication of nude photographs without the consent of the involved party
definitely falls within the purview of the traditional tort remedy, and would
appear to warrant protection for public figures as well as private ones, since
such a revelation is outrageous to the community's notions of decency.75
Because one would be hard pressed to formulate an argument that such a
disclosure has any relation to self-government, the liability of the publisher
should not be affected by the rules of first amendment privilege. Also, in
most cases it could not be said that a public figure has renounced his right
to privacy in this regard.
The Onassis examples demonstrate that the entry of the first amendment
into the public disclosure field has hardly been revolutionary, at least in
relation to voluntary public figures. The same results inhere whether the
constitutional privilege or the traditional public interest exception is applied.
More difficult problems arise, however, with respect to involuntary public
figures, those private individuals who find themselves unwillingly thrust into
the news.
C. Involuntary Public Figures
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant
of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value
on freedom of speech and of press. 76
71. Washington Post, April 14, 1975, § C, at 23, col. 5; Id. April 15, 1975, § B,
at 13, col. 5; Id. April 16, 1975, § B, at 15, col. 5; Id. April 17, 1975, § G, at 19, col. 5.
72. See RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Notes § 652 D, comment c, at 114. However,
exposure of an already public record would not give rise to a cause of action. See note
104 inf ra.
73. Even if such disclosure may be seen as an abuse of freedom of the press, tolera-
tion of such an abuse to protect first amendment values is in accord with the New York
Times/Hill toleration of falsehood to this end.
74. HUSTLER, Aug. 1975, at 31-36.
75. Cf. Myers v. 'United States Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765, 167
N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (model consented to nude photograph, but not to
distribution of same in nationally distributed magazine).
76. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
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With these words, the Supreme Court established the press' constitutional
privilege to report on the lives of private persons involuntarily caught up in
the news. 77  There have been important developments in this area of first
amendment privilege since Hill was decided.
In the 1971 libel case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,78 the New
York Times standard was held to apply to a private figure involuntarily
caught up in the news, in this instance a news dealer arrested for dissemina-
tion of obscene materials and later acquitted. Justice Brennan, writing for
the plurality, strongly asserted the proposition that the public's right to know
overcame the individual's right to be let alone:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot sud-
denly become less so merely because a private individual is in-
volved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntar-
ily" choose to become involved.
7 9
The relative fame or anonymity of those involved in issues of public concern
was seen as irrelevant to the full constitutional protection given to debate
on such matters . 0  The opinion admitted the possibility that the press might
abuse this protection, but this was viewed as a necessary evil which had
traditionally been borne by a society "dependent. .. for its survival upon a
vigorous free press . . .,,8
Justice Marshall, dissenting, perceived the considerations involved as
similar to those in the tort privacy cases, and he viewed with particular
concern an interpretation of "matters of public interest" so broad as to
preclude protection of the individual.82 The plurality responded by empha-
sizing that the cause of action was not one of invasion of privacy,8 3 comment-
77. For the sake of convenience, those people falling into this category will be classi-
fied as "involuntary public figures," although they are sometimes described by the courts
as "private figures." The distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" public fig-
ures is not always clearly drawn by the courts.
78. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Court was widely split. The plurality opinion, written
by Justice Brennan, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justice
Black concurred, reiterating his view that the first amendment precludes libel judgments
against the press. Id. at 57. Justice White concurred on the ground that the New York
Times rule covered the situation without need for the Court to engage in elaborations
of the principle. Id. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Id. at 78.
Justice Harlan dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 62. Justice Douglas did not par-
ticipate.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id. at 44.
81. Id. at 51.
82. Id. at 80. Justice Marshall felt that limiting recovery to actual damages would
sufficiently protect the press. Justice Harlan agreed with much of Justice Marshall's
opinion but would have permitted punitive damages in some circumstances.
83. Id. at 48.
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ing that "[w]e are not to be understood as implying that no area of a
person's activities falls outside the area of public or general interest. '8 4 This
is a reiteration of the idea expressed in Hill that unwarranted disclosure by
the media, outrageous to community mores, might be actionable. Again,
however, the extent of this protection was not discussed. 85
Just a few years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8 6 another libel case,
the Rosenbloom public issue approach was expressly repudiated by the
Court. In Gertz, the plaintiff was a lawyer who represented a family
bringing a wrongful death action against a Chicago policeman. The defend-
ant's publication, an organ of the John Birch Society, accused the plaintiff of
being a "Communist-fronter" who had framed the policeman and of helping
to plan -the riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The Court
held that the plaintiff was not a public figure, and that the New York Times
standard of malice would only be applied to those who were.87 According
to the Court, first amendment values were adequately protected by limiting
recovery against the press by private individuals in defamation actions to
compensation for actual injury, and by not allowing presumed or punitive
damages.
8 8
What impact the Gertz decision might have on actions for public disclo-
sure by private individuals against the media is a question of considerable
importance. It is crucial to remember that in Gertz the press was held
accountable for falsehoods published about a private figure. Indeed, the
distinction drawn between public and private figures stresses the opportunity
of the former to rebut incriminating falsehoods.89  This opportunity is
irrelevant in an action for public disclosure of private facts in which the
plaintiff "gains no relief from a subsequent retraction or correction . . . but,
on the contrary, suffers additional injury by the repeated exposure." 90  The
reasoning of Gertz is therefore irrelevant to public disclosure, although it
84. Id. at 44 n.12.
85. The Court's citation to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in this
context gives some indication, at least, that the marital intimacy involved there falls
within the area into which the media may be prevented from delving. 403 U.S. at 48.
See note 145 & accompanying text infra.
86. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
87. Id. at 345-46, 351-52. Although Gertz limited the coverage of the New York
Times principle, the Gertz Court gave no indication that it no longer subscribes to the
principle itself. See id. at 339-43.
88. Id. at 349-50. The Court thus adopted the views advanced by Justice Marshall
in his dissent in Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 86.
89. 418 U.S. at 344. The voluntariness of their public status is also stressed by the
Court. Id. at 344-45.
90. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35, 459 P.2d 912, 921, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369
(19,69) (disclosure of politician's family problems).
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does indicate a solicitous attitude on the part of the current Court toward the
private individual victimized by the media. However, the effect of this
apparent attitude on privacy actions has yet to be tested. 91
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,9 2 decided in March 1975, the Court
reviewed for the first time an action alleging public disclosure of private facts,
and applied the first amendment privilege to the media's disclosure of the
name of a rape victim. In previous cases, the interests of like individuals
were viewed as outweighing the rights of the press, and disclosure of the
identity of the victim was sometimes prohibited by statute.93  In order to
understand the ramifications of Cox Broadcasting, it is necessary to examine
the reasoning of these prior decisions.
In 1948, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute
prohibiting disclosure of a rape victim's identity.94  The court viewed the
slight restriction on the press as justified by the competing interest of
protecting the sensibilities of the victims and encouraging their cooperation
with the police. The court rejected as frivolous the assertion that the name
of the victim was newsworthy by stating that "[a]t most the publication of
the identity of the female ministers to a morbid desire to connect the details
of one of the most detestable crimes known to the law with the identity of
the victim." 95
In Hunter v. Washington Post,96 a 1974 civil action brought as a result of
disclosure of a rape victim's name, the Superior Court of the District of
91. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), a recent "false
light" action, the defendant newspaper published an "interview" with the plaintiff, the
widow of a disaster victim; the interview had never taken place. An eight-man majority
decided against the publisher. Since no objection had been made by the parties to jury
instructions based on the Hill standard, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether
this was the proper standard of liability for private individuals in "false light" actions.
At any rate, the presence of malice clearly made the case an unsuitable vehicle for the
Court to apply an approach along the lines of Gertz to privacy actions.
92. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1963). The statute construed in Cox Broadcasting is GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
94. State v. Evjue, 233 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948). The fact that the victim's
future standing in the community might be imperiled by such a disclosure helped weigh
the balance in this direction. Id. at 161, 33 N.W.2d at 312. The court reasoned that
if a parking violator wanted to avoid public exposure, a rape victim certainly would. (It
may be suggested that an unfortunate social attitude is reflected in the comparison of
a rape victim with a scofflaw.) Ironically, the Wisconsin courts do not recognize tort
recovery for invasion of privacy. Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925
(1956).
95. 233 Wis. at 161, 33 N.W.2d at 312. Apparently another judge saw the publica-
tion as a less heinous offense and refused to convict Evjue. See State v. Evjue, 254 Wis.
581, 37 N.W.2d 50 (1949).
96. 102 DAILy WASH. L. REP. 1561 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1974).
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
Columbia took a similar approach. The Hill standard was understood as
protecting a truthful publication "if it is newsworthy (of public or general
interest) and if it does not shock the community notion of decency. ' ' 97 The
court found it unnecessary to reach the community decency issue, since it
held that the identity of the victim was not newsworthy as a matter of law.
9
8
Gertz was seen as sanctioning this result since "[the plaintiff] was not a
public official or a public figure, but rather a helpless victim of a heinous
crime." 9o
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Georgia had employed a like
analysis in Cox Broadcasting° ° in finding for the plaintiff. The constitu-
tional issue presented was disposed of summarily, with the court holding that
the identity of a rape victim was not sufficiently a matter of public interest to
make disclosure of her identity warrant first amendment protection. 10 ' The
United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court, 10 2 resolving the issue
on the fact that the defendant broadcaster's reporter had learned the name
of the deceased rape victim from court records which were available for
public inspection. The majority, through Justice White, refused to decide
"whether the state may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from
unwanted publicity in the press.' 1 °8  Rather, the holding was based on the
traditional tort rule that no public disclosure action would lie for exposure of
public records.' ° 4 This rule was viewed as particularly apt with relation to
court proceedings in which "the function of the press serves to guarantee the
fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny
upon the administration of justice."'10 5
Two concurring opinions revealed broader notions among the members of
the Court concerning public disclosure. Justice Powell felt that Gertz
97. Id. at 1567. This is an adoption of the California view. See Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (en banc),
discussed at pp. 287-89 infra.
98. Id. Evjue was cited for this proposition.
99. Id.
100. 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
101. Id. at 68, 200 S.E.2d at 134 (on motion for rehearing).
102. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Powell
are discussed at pp. 286-87 infra. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment with-
out an opinion. Justice Rehnquist dissented on jurisdictional grounds.
103. Id.at491.
104. Id. For a discussion of the public records exception, see PxossER § 117, at 810-
11 & § 118, at 830-33. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368
P.2d 147 (1962) (information garnered from court records privileged in public dis-
closure).
105. 420 U.S. at 492.
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resolved the issue in Cox Broadcasting by holding truth to be a defense to a
private person's defamation action, since the interests of the individual
protected by the libel action in Gertz and the disclosure action in this case
were so similar. 10 6 Justice Douglas, the Court's sole proponent of the
absolutist theory of the first amendment, reiterated his position that damages
cannot be imposed upon the press for mere discussion of public affairs, with
public affairs being given the broad, self-fulfilling definition of anything the
media decides to cover.
107
The Cox Broadcasting decision makes sense in terms of tort law in its
use of the public records exception, and also seems consonant with the
Meiklejohn analysis of the first amendment. Obviously the courts are an
important part of the American system of government, and information
about what goes on in them is necessary for meaningful self-government. But
it is important to explore whether the result should be the same if the
victim's name is not procured from public records. Under the rationale of
Hill, the crime victim's identity is news, and thus its publication is protected.
In light of this, it must be questioned whether peculiar social attitudes toward
the crime of rape limit the right of the press to report it. Certainly the desire
of the victim to avoid embarrassment is understandable, but this interest
cannot be said to be stronger than that of the innocent person suspected
of criminal activity who is identified by the media, disclosure of whose
identity was permitted even before the advent of the first amendment priv-
ilege.' 06
In their use of a balancing test, both the District of Columbia court in
Hunter and the Georgia court in Cox Broadcasting relied strongly on Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Association,'"0 a 1971 decision by -the Supreme Court of
California which presents another illustration of legitimate and sympathetic
interests in conflict with the first amendment privilege. In Briscoe, the
plaintiff had been convicted of truck hijacking, served time in prison and
apparently led a quiet, law-abiding existence upon release. Eleven years
after the actual commission of the crime, the plaintiff was associated with the
hijacking incident in an article in Reader's Digest, allegedly causing his fam-
ily, friends and business associates to desert him. Justice Peters held that
even though -the subject of the article was newsworthy as a matter of law,
106. Id. at 497-500. The majority opinion also noted the similarity of the problem
in Cox Broadcasting to allowing truth as a defense in libel. Id. at 490 n.19.
107. Id. at 500-01.
108. For an example of this double standard, see Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1975, §
A, at 13, col. 5.
109. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
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the identity of the participant was not."10 Such a result was seen as consist-
ent with the Hill standard, since the plaintiff's name was perceived as outside
the range of self-governing speech. In addition, the court stated that such
a disclosure could fit into the community notions of decency category enunci-
ated in Hill."' Moreover, the interests protected 'by preventing this kind of
revelation were not limited to those of the individual involved since the state
has a strong interest in allowing rehabilitated criminals to function produc-
tively in society."
2
It has been suggested that the Briscoe approach may be adopted by the
United States Supreme Court when it faces the issue of public disclosure and
the first amendment. 113  Whether the California court's view truly protects
first amendment values as articulated by the Meiklejohn theory must be
examined. Several difficulties present themselves. First is 'the possibility
that the vitality of Briscoe has been undermined by Cox Broadcasting. The
name of a convicted criminal is a matter of 'public record. Since the dis-
closure of the contents of a public record was held to come within the first
amendment privilege, a question is raised ,as to whether the age of the record
should diminish the privilege. 114
In addition, the Briscoe court balanced social values to define what is
"newsworthy" and hence protected. 1 5 Although lip service was paid to the
Meiklejohn theory, the court was sufficiently concerned with the competing
interests presented that self-governing speech was defined restrictively and
arbitrarily. Press coverage of crime was afforded first amendment protec-
tion, but an exception was carved out for the identity of rehabilitated
criminals. Even assuming arguendo that such a disclosure constitutes an
abuse of the first amendment privilege, the breathing space envisioned in
Hill is nevertheless designed to protect the press from the consequences of
such inadvertent abuse when reporting on matters important to self-govern-
ment.1 6 Although the court conceded the need for predictability in first
amendment interpretation in order to avoid a chilling effect on the press, no
definite standard enabling editors and reporters to avoid liability was estab-
110. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
111. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
112. Id.
113. See H. Zuckman, Mass Communications Law in a Nutshell, 97 (unpublished
manuscript).
114. No distinctions concerning the age of the public record seem to have been made
by courts applying the traditional tort rule. See generally PRossER § 118, at 830-33.
115. As to the contradiction inherent in applying a balancing test under the Meikle-
john theory, see p. 281 & note 65 supra.
116. See 4 Cal. 3d at 537, 483 P.2d at 37-39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
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lished beyond -the equivocal, subjective concepts of newsworthiness and com-
munity notions of decency.117
The Gertz decision indicates that the Supreme Court is satisfied that
limiting allowable damages will sufficiently counter a chilling effect on
freedom of the press when the competing interest is the reputation of a
private individual. But it must be emphasized that Gertz dealt with "false
statements of fact" which are of "no constitutional value." 1 8 Disclosure of
truth is generally protected by the first amendment and would seem to
deserve much greater latitude. Perhaps the broad public interest privilege
envisioned in Rosenbloom, which protected "all discussion and communica-
tion involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to
whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous," 119 would be more
suited to public disclosure.
The Rosenbloom standard would probably protect the freedom to disclose
Briscoe's name, but it would also leave many problems unresolved. Efforts
by the courts to determine the meaning of "matters of public or general
concern" or "news" have hardly been satisfactory, 20 and the concept of a
community notion of decency remains equally vague.' 2' Furthermore, the
basic issue of how to protect the competing interest of privacy would require
resolution. The first amendment is surely not a license to "intrude upon [an
individual's] most intimate activities, and expose his most personal character-
istics to public gaze.' 1 22
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A determination must be made of which values are included in the
117. Id. at 541-43, 483 P.2d at 43-44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
118. 418 U.S. at 340. The Court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the inten-
tional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interests in "un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.
Id. at 339-40.
119. 403 U.S. at 44.
120. See note 31 supra. See generally Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-
Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 722
(1963).
121. The problems with a test based on community notions of decency derive from
the difficulty of discerning what they are and from the rapidity with which they seem
to change. As Professor Kalven points out, what were flagrant breaches of decency to
Warren and Brandeis would go unnoticed today. See Kalven, supra note 8, at 328-30.
122. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 533, 483 P.2d 34, 37, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971).
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concept of privacy, and whether the right to privacy as protected by the
tort of public disclosure is, like freedom of the press, a constitutional right.
Since Warren and Brandeis described the right to privacy as part of "the
more general right of the individual to be let alone,' 23 the question of the
basic values which modern tort privacy is designed to protect has provoked
great disagreement among commentators.' 24
Dean Prosser, in his initial delineation of the four branches of tort privacy,
viewed public disclosure as essentially an extension of defamation, protecting
against harm to reputation.' 25 This hypothesis evoked a strong response
from Professor Bloustein, who perceived all four branches of the tort as
protecting the single interest of "inviolate personality.' 26  Tying public
disclosure up with the terminology of defamation, he argued, failed to
recognize its uniqueness in protected personal dignity, a concept he viewed
as having strong constitutional underpinnings. 127
Writing several years later, Prosser acknowledged the possibility of a con-
stitutional base for the law of tort privacy.' 28 Discussing the famous case of
Griswold v. Connecticut,129 in which the Supreme Court afforded the
constitutional right to privacy an independent status, together with two
123. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
124. See authorities cited note 8 supra. The problems of defining tort privacy are
also discussed in Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A Na-
tional Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 630-32 (1968).
125. Prosser, supra note 5, at 398.
126. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
127. Id. at 979-82. Professor Bloustein described vividly the possible consequences
of lack of personal privacy:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others
and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to pub-
lic scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity. Such
an individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never
to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally
accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of
unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a
being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual.
The conception of man embodied in our tradition and incorporated in our
Constitution stands at odds to such human fungibility. And our law of pri-
vacy attempts to preserve individuality by placing sanctions upon outrageous
or unreasonable violations of the conditions of its sustenance. This, then, is
the social value served by the law of privacy, and it is served not only in the
law of tort, but in numerous other areas of the law as well.
Id. at 1003.
128. PROSSER § 117, at 816.
129. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives de-
clared invalid).
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decisions which foreshadowed Griswold,130 he noted that although no refer-
ence to tort law had been made in these cases,
[t]hey suggested nonetheless that the Constitutional right, thus de-
clared to exist, must have some application to tort liability; and that
the decisions in four states denying any recognition of the right are
to be overruled, as well as the limitation to commercial appropria-
tion contained in the statutes of four other jurisdictions.'
3'
Prosser optimistically asserted that extension to tort liability had already
begun in the courts.' 3 2 Two of the decisions he cited for this proposition
involve disclosure. In York v. Story,'81 which predates Griswold, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a federal civil
rights action could be based on the constitutional right to privacy. The
plaintiff, a young woman, complained to the police about an assault and was
required to pose in the nude for a police photographer. The photographs,
which had nothing whatsoever to do with legitimate police procedure, were
subsequently circulated throughout the police department. This activity was
held to be a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law.
While the court was unable to perceive the situation in terms of a tradi-
tional fourth amendment search, it had no doubt that such an abuse of
privacy was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'8
4
Although York appears to support the contention that public disclosure
has a constitutional base, a caveat is in order. First, the press was not
involved, which eliminates any question of a countervailing first amendment
privilege. More important, the wrong was perpetrated by state officers,
bringing the case directly within the scope of the Supreme Court privacy
cases, which deal specifically with the prevention of government interfer-
ence. 135 Thus, York's validity may extend no further than its specific facts.
The 1968 case of Dietemann v. Time, Inc.' 36 was an action governed by
state tort law brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The
130. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to privacy implied in the fourth
amendment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
131. PRossER § 117, at 816.
132. Id.
133. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
134. 324 F.2d at 455. Prosser viewed the case as involving intrusion, PRossER § 117,
at 816, but the facts would easily support a cause of action for disclosure.
135. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (right to privacy implicit
in fourth amendment). The civil rights statute under which the plaintiff sued required
that the wrong be done by state officers under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
136. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
1976]
I Catholic University Law Review
defendant publisher had reporters enter plaintiff's home on a ruse, in order
to investigate his practices as a self-styled healer. As a result, a photograph
of the plaintiff, to which he had not consented, was published in Life
magazine. The court held that the defendant's claim of first amendment
privilege was met and disposed of by the plaintiff's constitutional right to
privacy, since these rights were entitled to equal weight.'8 7
Again, this holding can only be accepted as supporting Prosser's proposi-
tion with qualifications. The appeals court's affirmance does not deal with
the constitutional implications of privacy, stressing instead the tort of intru-
sion. 1' 8 Furthermore, the district court, in reaching the constitutional is-
sue, may well have been influenced by the cooperation the defendants re-
ceived -from government agents, who used the reporters to further their in-
vestigation into the plaintiff's pseudo-medical activities.
Dean Prosser's position notwithstanding, the more common view among
the courts seems to be that the right to privacy protected by tort law and the
constitutional right to privacy are not the same thing.'39 The constitutional
right appears limited to freedom from government intrusion.140  Moreover,
even with state action present, the right remains limited in its operation to
the most intimate personal affairs. 141
The hesitancy of lower courts to extend constitutional privacy beyond
these limits is understandable in light of the Supreme Court decisions which
have interpreted the right solely as a restriction on government interference
with the lives of citizens. 142  Furthermore, the independent right to privacy
which was first developed in Griswold appears to be restricted to the
protection of activities analogous to the use of contraception involved in that
137. 284 F. Supp. at 929.
138. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
139. As expressed in one opinion: "It misses the heart and spirit of the Griswold
case to casually infer an intent to adopt into the Constitution the entire body of the
tort law right to privacy." Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 113 (1966). But see
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 415 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (privacy pro-
tected by tort same as that recognized as constitutional right); Afro-American Publish-
ing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (values protected by tort privacy
"cognate" with those protected by the Constitution).
140. See Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
141. See Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872
(1973); Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1969). Certainly there is no intima-
tion that the constitutional and tort privacy are the same in Cox Broadcasting.
142. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952). But cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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case. 143  Another possible constitutional foundation for the right to privacy,
however, has been advanced and deserves mention: the idea that privacy
has first amendment underpinnings, since the concept of self-governing
speech is unworkable unless the private individual is free to express ideas
without fear of public exposure.' 4 4
The essential similarity among the values protected by the constitutional
right to privacy and the intrusion and disclosure branches of invasion of
privacy tort law is evident. As Professor Bloustein developed the analogy:
"The threat to individual liberty is undoubtedly greater when a policeman
taps a telephone than when an estranged spouse does, but a similar wrong is
perpetuated in both instances."'1 45 'It should be emphasized that not all
tort privacy plaintiffs are vindicating this kind of wrong. The complaints
of Briscoe and the rape victims appear to fall outside the spirit of any
constitutional right to privacy, while -that involving Jacqueline Onassis'
nude photographs clearly fits within it, as would the interference with her
confidential papers and records. If such an unwarranted interference by the
government may be remedied, 146 a remedy should likewise be enforced
against a private individual similarly interfering with another's privacy, and
the invasion of privacy torts provide the means to do it. The question which
remains is whether such interests can be protected without violating the
guarantees of the first amendment.
143. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (pregnancy);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
144. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 19, 546-47 (1970);
Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973); cf. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess pornographic materials for use in one's
own home protected by the first amendment). The plurality opinion in Griswold viewed
privacy as a penumbral right of the first amendment, 381 U.S. at 483-84, but the current
Court seems to prefer placing the right to privacy under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973). For
a historical perspective on Griswold, see R. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitu-
tional Charter For An Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MicI. L. REV. 197 (1965);
Emerson, Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 219 (1965);
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgot-
ten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965); McKay, The Right of Pri-
vacy: Emanation And Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965); Sutherland, Pri-
vacy In Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283 (1965).
145. Bloustein, supra note 126, at 975. The need to analogize these two strains of
privacy law are recognized in Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to
Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 979, 994-95.
146. Government interference with the right to privacy is remedied by damages in
civil actions, see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
939 (1964), and the exclusionary rule in criminal actions, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
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V. ACCOMMODATING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It has been established that the tort of public disclosure of private facts
protects legitimate interests, some of which are at least consonant with those
protected by the Constitution. It has also been asserted that in order for the
press to perform its role in the constitutional system most effectively, it must
be given a wide berth for expression. 'In some instances, as with the
unconsented to publication of nude photographs of an individual, there will
be no clash between freedom from disclosure and the first amendment's aims
of self-governing speech. In the more common case, however, the matter
disclosed will fall at least arguably within the category of self-governing
speech and thus be entitled to first amendment protection. It is this
situation, in which self-governing speech and the preservation of the individ-
ual's zone of privacy conflict, that has so troubled the courts and commenta-
tors.
'Unfortunately, the formulation of a predictable and consistent test seems
impossible. A balancing of the competing interests does not sufficiently
protect first amendment values.1 47  The cryptic, subjectively interpreted
terminology of "public figures," "newsworthiness" and "community notions
of decency" provides a potential straightjacket for vigorous freedom of the
press. Also, the excision of an individual's name from a news item to
protect the privacy interest, as is often suggested,148 does not provide a
meaningful resolution. Forcing editors to decide daily the names of which
individuals should 'be deleted from news stories because of possible tort
liability is an obvious way to induce self-censorship by the press.1 49 Yet, an
effective, predictable method may conceivably be devised to protect privacy
and ensure freedom of the press.
Pearson v. Dodd'50 involved a situation similar to, and one of the same
protagonists as, the Onassis financial records case. Columnists Drew Pear-
son and Jack Anderson published the contents of private documents taken
from the private files of then Senator Thomas Dodd. Judge Wright, writing
for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, viewed
147. Seep. 281 supra.
148. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Ct. App. 1931) (iden-
tity of reformed prostitute privileged even if murder trial she had been involved in
was newsworthy). This is also suggested by Professor Bloustein. Bloustein, supra note
8, at 623-24.
149. Nor does excising identity from a news item have any effect on problems with
public figures. The problem is particularly acute in a "hot news" situation, in which
the paramount interest lies in getting the news to the audience as quickly as possible.
150. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
,[Vol. 25:271
Public Disclosure of Private Facts
the publication of papers with such obvious political implications as privi-
leged even under the traditional public interest exception.1 51 However, a
cause of action for intrusion, rather than disclosure, was viewed as meeting
no such obstacle. One who intrudes unlawfully on a plaintiff's solitude is
liable regardless of any public interest in what he may learn as a result. 152
The court's interpretation of what is within the purview of intrusion should
also be noted: the plaintiff should be protected from such an invasion of
privacy in any area in which it would not be reasonably expected, just as an
individual is protected from such interference by the government under the
fourth amendment.
1 53
The court's approach in Dodd makes two very important points. First,
intrusion does not directly conflict with the first amendment privilege of
freedom of the press. Whatever the reach of the first amendment concern-
ing the gathering of news,1 54 it is clear that its protection does not attach to
crimes and torts committed in the process.' 5 5 Second, it is obvious that the
tort of intrusion, rather than public disclosure, is much better designed to
remedy a violation of the right to privacy; the analogy between a private
"intrusion" and a governmental "search" seems reasonable.
Using recovery for intrusion as a remedy for invasions of privacy by the
news media, while retaining the press' immunity to suits for public disclosure,
is a judicial technique which can protect first amendment values more
effectively than the approaches previously considered. This method avoids
complicated tests which could hamstring self-governing speech, while assur-
ing greater predictability in the area. In addition, it avoids the entire
"public figure" and "news" morass. That something definitely within the
public interest, and thus part of self-governing speech, is disclosed by an
intrusion is of no relevance to the subsequent cause of action. Moreover,
public figures and officials would not be entitled to lesser protection because
of their status, any more than the fourth amendment would be of diminished
application to them on that account. On the other hand, whether the
concept of intrusion protects privacy as well as it protects the first amend-
ment requires further examination.
The surreptitious taking of nude photographs of Ms. Onassis would clearly
151. Id. at 706.
152. Id. at 705. The court went on to state that the manner in which the informa-
tion is obtained is irrelevant to a public disclosure action, an assertion of dubious valid-
ity. Id.
153. Id. at 704.
154. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
155. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1971); p.
291 supra.
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be actionable as an intrusion. One no doubt has a reasonable expectation of
privacy on one's private Greek island. Additionally, the procurement of Ms.
Onassis's private financial records would clearly fall under the purview of
Pearson v. Dodd as an unprotected intrusion. The Briscoe and Cox cases,
on the other hand, exhibit no facts conducive to a cause of action for
intrusion. However, it is significant that the plaintiffs in these cases were
seeking redress essentially for damage to reputation and embarrassment,
rather than for a violation of a right akin to constitutional privacy. While
the claims presented were not insignificant, as exemplified by the great
damage alleged in Briscoe,156 such interests must nevertheless yield to first
amendment rights, which are paramount in allowing our constitutional
system to function. Of course, public disclosure of facts obtained by intrusion
may cause loss of personal dignity and grave humiliation to the plaintiff, but
this should go only to the issue of damages. Rather, it is the breach of the
"zone of privacy" erected by the individual, necessary for his psychological
well-being, and vital to our social and governmental order, that is the basis of
the action. 15 7 It would not be impossible, however, for the interests of the
individual, such as those involved in Briscoe and Cox, to be protected in a
manner not so directly antagonistic to the first amendment. For example,
procedures by the police and the judicial system to insure the anonymity of
rape victims could be undertaken. 58
It would be frivolous to assert that this approach is not free from
problems. For example, in Dodd, the defendants were held not liable for
intrusion because while they knew that the documents had been removed
without authorization, they did not themselves remove them, such knowledge
156. See p. 287 supra.
157. See Emerson, supra note 144, at 548-50. Professor Emerson would limit dis-
closure actions to those areas covered by the constitutional right of privacy set out in
Griswold. Id. at 556-57. However, he notes that the values he discusses are better pro-
tected by the prevention of the ascertainment of private information than by its dissemi-
nation. Id. at 548.
158. Making such records private would mean that a cause of action would lie if they
were wrongfully obtained or revealed. See Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc. 2d 759, 317
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (mistakenly arrested plaintiff's surname expunged from
police records; records sealed by the court). It would also be possible for a court to
enjoin release of information wrongfully obtained, though this would seem to raise prob-
lems of prior restraints. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610,
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). It should be pointed out that although these meth-
ods would not have aided Briscoe, he did have the possibility of a "false light" action,
although it had been incorrectly pleaded. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 876 (1971). It has been reported that the Briscoe case was removed to fed-
eral court on remand, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv.
57, 81 n.125 (1974).
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being alone insufficient to satisfy the tort of intrusion. 159 Presumably, a
cause of action would lie against the person who actually took the docu-
ments, either for intrusion, or, if the perpetrator were an employee with ac-
cess to the documents, for breach of contract. Admittedly, not every such
wrong could be effectively remedied by one of these causes of action. How-
ever, it seems to cover most of the situations in which the individual's "zone
of privacy" is breached, and the value of eliminating complicated rules re-
stricting first amendment rights outweighs the concern for an occasionally
dissatisfied plaintiff.
Moreover, this approach does not seem to conflict with the traditional
attitude of the courts toward recovery for public disclosure against the press.
Two examples from the Restatement (Second) of Torts can be used to
illustrate this lack of conflict:
A gives birth to a child with two heads, which immediately dies.
A reporter from B newspaper asks A's permission to photograph
the body of the child, which is refused. The reporter then bribes
hospital attendants to permit him, against A's orders, to take the
photograph, which is published in B newspaper with an account of
the facts, naming A. B has invaded A's privacy.'
60
A, a girl twelve years old, gives birth to a child. B newspaper pub-
lishes a report of the event, together with a picture of A and her
child. B is privileged to do so.161
Certainly, the distinguishing factor in these cases is the manner in which the
press went about getting the news. In a number of cases, recovery for
public disclosure against the press could have been just as easily based on
intrusion or some other cause of action.1
62
The concern here is not with the history of public disclosure in the courts,
but with its future. An attempt has been made to demonstrate the infringe-
ment upon first amendment rights that occurs by allowing such recovery
against the news media, and the futility of trying to compile a set of rules
159. 410 F.2d 701, 705. Nor was a cause of action for conversion stated. Id. at
706-07.
160. RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Notes § 652D, illustration 8, at 115. The example
is based on Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930), and
is used to illustrate the degree of privacy the tort is designed to protect.
161. RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Notes § 652D, illustration 3, at 129. The ex-
ample is based on Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956), and
illustrates the public interest exception.
162. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d, 610 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (breach of contract); Daily Times Democrat v. Gra-
ham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (intrusion); Harms v. Miami Daily News,
Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. App. 1961) ("false light").
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that would permit the action but prevent a concomitant chilling effect on the
press. To circumvent this dilemma, it is proposed that a right to privacy
cognate with that protected by the Constitution be preserved against the
press' unwarranted invasion by the tort action of intrusion, which poses no
threat to the guarantees of the first amendment. In this fashion, perhaps,
freedom of the press and the right to privacy, two of the strongest founda-
tions of American constitutional democracy, can effectively and harmonious-
ly perform their respective functions.
Samuel Soopper
Author's note: While this article was being prepared for publication, the Supreme Court
once again addressed the problem of libel and the first amendment. In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 44 U.S.L.W. 4262 (U.S., March 2, 1976), the Court found that the socially
prominent wife of a Firestone tire company heir was not a public figure. Accordingly,
she was not required to prove that the press' inaccurate account of a court order from
her highly publicized divorce proceeding was made with actual malice before damages
for libel could be allowed. By so ruling, the Court increased the restrictions of the New
York Times doctrine, first announced in Gertz, by further limiting the category of public
figures to which the doctrine applies. The Court viewed the press' freedom to report
on judicial proceedings as adequately protected by Cox Broadcasting.
The distinction made by the Firestone Court between true and false accounts by the
press indicates once again that the restriction of the first amendment privilege in the
area of libel is due to the lack of constitutional protection afforded the false statements
involved there. Thus, the inference* is clear that this restriction of the press protection
will not extend to instances involving public disclosure of private, true facts. See discus-
sion pp. 284-85, 289 supra.
